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SECTION 5.22 OF THE TEXAS FAMILY CODE: CONTROL
AND MANAGEMENT OF THE MARITAL ESTATE
by Ronald G. Williams
Protection of the marital estate from attacks by creditors, fraudulent
schemes of third parties, and mismanagement by the spouses during mar-
riage has long been a primary concern to legislatures and courts throughout
the United States. In Texas the husband traditionally has been recognized
as the head of the household, trustee of the marital estate, and the sole
manager of the community assets,' the wife having little right to manage,
control, or dispose of any of the marital assets without joinder of her
spouse.2 This inequality in management and control rights, coupled with
the wife's lack of adequate remedies during marriage to protect her interest
in the marital assets,3 enabled the husband to abuse his position of managing
spouse to the detriment of the community estate.4  Frequently, the wife's
only recourse when the marital assets were diminished by the husband was
to institute a suit for divorce and rescission of all transfers that were in ac-
tual or constructive fraud of her rights. 5
In 1967 the Texas Legislature enacted extensive revisions in the area
of control and management of matrimonial property,6 which were subse-
quently codified into chapter five of the Texas Family Code.7 The intent
of these revisions was to place the wife on a level of equality with her hus-
band in the area of control of the marital estate and thereby curtail the
abuse of the husband's management powers.8 The purpose of this Com-
ment is to evaluate these statutory control provisions as they relate to the role
of each spouse during marriage, to analyze past and present judicial pro-
nouncements regarding concealment and diminishment techniques, and to
attempt to determine whether the legislature has completely solved the long-
standing problems of control resulting from the inequality between spouses.
I 1 0. SPEER, SPEER'S MAuTAL PRoPERTY RiGrs 1N TEXAs § 365, at 526 (4th ed.
1961).
2 Id. § 361, at 524.
3 See notes 176-86 infra, and accompanying text.
4 Texas courts have dealt with many cases where the husband abused his control
and management powers by: (1) concealing or diminishing the extent or value of
the marital estate (see Roberson v. Roberson, 420 S.W.2d 495 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1967), error ref. n.r.e.; Miller v. Miller, 285 S.W. 837 (Tex. Civ. App.-
San Antonio 1926), error dismissed); (2) enhancing the value of his separate estate
at the expense of the community (see Burton v. Bell, 300 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. 1964);
Daniels v. Daniels, 490 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1973), error dismissed);
and (3) seeking to entangle the marital estate to make a just and equitable division
of the marital property on divorce more difficult (see Herring v. Blakeley, 385 S.W.2d
843 (Tex. 1965); Davis v. Davis, 495 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973),
error dismissed).
5 See Dillard v. Dillard, 341 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1960), error
ref. n.r.e.
6 Act of May 27, 1967, ch. 309, [1967] Tex. Laws 735 (repealed 1970).
7 TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 5.01-.87 (Supp. 1973).
8 For two excellent discussions of the history of the Family Code, see Hudspeth,
The Matrimonial Property Act of 1967--Six Areas of Change, 31 Tx. B.J. 477(1968); McKnight, Recodification of Matrimonial Property Law, 29 TEx. B.J. 1000
(1966).
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
1. PAST AND PRESENT PROVISIONS OF CONTROL
The basic philosophy of the Texas community property systems is that
upon marriage the husband and wife become partners, sharing in the losses
suffered and gains made until the marriage is terminated by death or di-
vorce. 9 The objective of Texas law in assigning management and control
of the marital estate has been to preserve harmonious marital relations
while furthering the goal of stability in commercial transactions.
Control Provisions Prior to 1967. Texas derived its community property
system from Spanish law, under which the wife's interest in the marital
estate equaled that of her husband. The only real distinction between the
interests of the two spouses was that during the marriage, the wife's rights
were passive while those of her husband were active.' 0 Under Spanish
law the husband, as head of the household, had authority to alienate com-
munity property without consent of his wife; however, he also had a cor-
responding duty to use community assets to maintain his family."
Early Texas statutes perpetuated the Spanish system and gave the hus-
band the right of exclusive management and control of the community es-
tate. 12  The courts through various decisions accepted the husband as the
managing spouse during the marriage, and allowed him the ease of alien-
ability that was established under Spanish law. 18 The few restraints placed
on the husband's power of management, control, and disposition required
that his dealings with the community assets enhance the community estate,
and not be in fraud of the wife's rights. 14 Prior to 1913 Texas law afforded
the husband the power of management and control of all the community
property, as well as the wife's separate property.' 5 In 1913, however, the
Texas Legislature enacted a statute giving the wife the management of her
special community property, which consisted of her personal earnings and in-
come from her separate property.16  This express statutory authority of
control was revoked in 1925,17 but her management powers over her spe-
cial community property were inferred from other statutory provisions.
Article 4616 of the Revised Civil Statutes exempted the wife's special com-
munity property from liability for her husband's debts. 18 Article 4621 im-
plied that special community property was liable for the wife's contracts. 19
Although Texas courts stated on various occasions that the special com-
9 1 0. SPEER, supra note 1, § 350, at 508.
1Old. § 90, at 118.
11Id.
12 Act of March 21, 1913, ch. 32, § 1 [1913] Tex. Laws 61 (repealed 1925); Act of
March 13, 1848, ch. 79, § 2, [1848] Tex. Laws 77, 3 H. GAMMEL, LAws or TEXAS 77
(1898) (repealed 1911).
'3 Higgins v. Johnson, 20 Tex. 389 (1857); Brunson v. Donald, 3 S.W.2d 596(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1928), error ref.; Scott v. Scott, 170 S.W. 273 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1914).
14 See 3 SPEER, supra note 1, § 607, at 322.
15 Huie, Commentary on the Community Property Law of Texas, 13 Tx. REv.
Civ. STAT. ANN. 2, 39 (1960).
16 Act of March 21, 1913, ch. 32, § 1, [1913] Tex. Laws 61 (repealed 1925).
17 Act of March 16, 1925, ch. 82, § 1, [1925] Tex. Laws 253 (repealed 1967).
IS Act of June 6, 1957, ch. 407, § 2, [19571 Tex. Laws 1234 (repealed 1967).
19 Act of March 12, 1921, ch. 130, § 1, [1921] Tex. Laws 251 (repealed 1967).
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munity property was under the "exclusive control" of the wife, most of these
cases dealt with a creditor of the husband attempting to levy upon the
wife's special community property for payment of a debt.20 The state of
the law regarding the wife's affirmative management powers over the spe-
cial community was not as clearly defined as the extensive management
powers over the general community afforded the husband. 21
Control Under the Texas Family Code. The Matrimonial Property Act
of 1967 and its codification into the Family Code in 197022 introduced sig-
nificant changes into the Texas system of management and control of separate
and community property during marriage. 23  The revisions revitalized the
Act of 191324 by again dividing the community property into three distinct
classifications subject to different rules of control and disposition. Sec-
tions 5.2 125 and 5.2226 effectively divide the marital estate into separately
owned property subject to the control of the owning spouse, community prop-
erty subject to the management and control of the spouse who would have
owned it had there been no marriage, and a new class of mixed community
property subject to joint control and disposition of both spouses.
Section 5.01 defines separate and community property in basically the
same manner as defined under Spanish law, except that the definition is in
terms of "spouses" rather than terms of the "husband" and "wife." '27
Under this section a spouse's separate property consists of that owned or
claimed by the spouse prior to marriage and that property acquired during
marriage by gift, devise, or descent. 28  Community property consists of
all other property acquired during the marriage. 20  Section 5.22(b) pro-
vides that if community property subject to the sole management of one
spouse is co-mingled with community property subject to the sole manage-
ment of the other spouse, it becomes "mixed" community property subject
to the management of both spouses.30
The sections of the Family Code providing for separate and joint manage-
ment and control present strong evidence that the Texas Legislature intended
to place the spouses on a level of equality in the area of marital property
rights. The new statute significantly reduces the power of the husband act-
ing alone to deal with community assets. Prior to 1967, unless spouses
2 0 See, e.g., Bearden v. Knight, 149 Tex. 108, 228 S.W.2d 837 (1950); Hawkins v.
Britton State Bank, 122 Tex. 69, 52 S.W.2d 243 (1932).
21 Quilliam, Gratuitous Transfers of Community Property to Third Persons, 2 TEXAS
TECH. L. REV. 23, 24 (1970).
22 TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1 (Supp. 1973).
23 The 1967 and 1970 codification into the Family Code was a direct result of the
Texas bar's call for revision of the marital property statutes. This step seemed an
attempt to pacify a group seeking equal rights for women, since a proposal which
had been made to the Texas bar that an amendment be passed to the Texas con-
stitution insuring these equal rights had been resoundingly rejected by referendum vote
of the bar. See McKnight, supra note 8.
24 Act of March 21, 1913, ch. 32, § 1, [1913] Tex. Laws 61 (repealed 1925).
25 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.21 (Supp. 1973).
26Id. § 5.22.
271d. § 5.01.2 8 /d. § 5.01(a).




kept separate accounts for separate, community, and special community as-
sets, the husband's extensive managerial powers over the general commu-
nity assets encompassed all of the marital estate. 31 Now the situation has
been reversed, for when separate assets or community assets under separate
management are co-mingled, they automatically become subject to the joint
management, control, and disposition of both spouses.3 2  Whether the leg-
islative intent of equality in control and management evidenced by these
sections has indeed become a reality, and whether the legislature has succeeded
in providing viable legislative safeguards against concealment, diminish-
ment, or entanglement of the marital estate by one spouse acting alone is
open to question.
Criticism of the Control Provisions of the Texas Family Code. Section
5.22 provides for a separate management system allowing equality of con-
trol and disposition if both spouses have personal earnings.33  Thus, at
first glance, the Family Code provision seems to answer the demand for
equality, thereby allowing the court to partition property equitably upon
dissolution of the marriage without the possibility of concealment or entangle-
ment by one spouse of a major portion of the community estate. However,
this provision is subject to serious criticism. While the statute provides
for equality of management and control when both spouses earn income
outside the home, it says nothing about the control and management in-
terests of a spouse who contributes only services relating to the manage-
ment of the home and family. One commentator has suggested that for the
Texas law to provide true equality in control and protection, a court would
have to attribute a constructive salary to the spouse remaining at home for
the value of his or her services rendered.3 4 Absent such judicial action, in
the guise of equality Texas law allows the working spouse to regain the role
of managing partner as existed in prior Texas statutes 35 and case law. 36
Therefore, similar opportunities for the use of diversified schemes of conceal-
ment and diminishment which existed under prior law may still exist under
the Family Code.3 7
The need for ease of disposition of property and stability in commercial
transactions has given rise to another problem regarding joint management,
control, and disposition of community assets. A provision was needed which
31 Act of March 25, 1927, ch. 148, § 1, [1927] Tex. Laws 219 (repealed 1967).
82 TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.22(b) (Supp. 1973).
33 Id. § 5.22(a).
34 See Comment, Community Property: Male Management and Women's Rights,
1972 LAw & Soc. ORDER 163, 172. No Texas case has been found applying this
approach.
35 Act of May 30, 1959, ch. 404, § 1, [1959] Tex. Laws 881 (repealed 1967); Act
of March 25, 1927, ch. 148, § 1, [1927] Tex. Laws 219 (repealed 1967).36 See, e.g., King v. Matner, 259 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1953),
error ref. n.r.e.; Locke v. Locke, 143 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1940);
McJunkin v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 131 S.W.2d 1085 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1939),
error dismissed, judgment correct.
37 Cf. Givens v. Girard Life Ins. Co. of America, 480 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1972), error ref. n.r.e. (attempted purchase of a life insurance policy for the
benefit of an unrelated person with community funds); Bohn v. Bohn, 455 S.W.2d
401 (Tex. Civ. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] 1970), error dismissed (wife contended that
gift of stock to husband was induced by his breach of confidence).
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would protect third parties in dealings with the "mixed community prop-
erty," but which would also prevent slow and tedious commercial transac-
tions, a possible result of any requirement of obtaining joinder of both spouses
for sales and other dispositions of mixed community assets. Section 5.24
of the Family Code established a presumption that community property held
in the name or the actual possession of one spouse is subject to that spouse's
control. ss A third party dealing with that spouse may rely on this pre-
sumption and obtain good title from the vendor spouse so long as the third
party has no notice of the spouse's lack of authority, and is not a party to a
fraud on the other spouse.39 Despite the clear language envisaging joint
control in section 5.22, this presumption potentially results in allowing one
spouse to dispose of the mixed or separate community property of the other
spouse without the knowledge or joinder of the non-consenting spouse.
This presumption section conflicts in purpose and effect with section 5.22
and also could allow pre-1967 concealment and diminishment techniques to
remain effective under the Family Code.
Personal property held during marriage often has no formal or legalistic
documents or other indicia of title, and, therefore, the spouse in possession of
the property will be presumed to be the owner. 40  An illustration of diminish-
ment devices which may be effective with the help of this presumption sec-
tion is the use by a husband of mixed community assets to discharge an
individual debt without his wife's knowledge. The creditor will receive good
title from the misappropriating spouse unless he has sufficient knowledge
of fraud or lack of authority. 41 But the defrauded spouse may nonetheless
be left without an adequate remedy if the remaining community assets are
nominal and the separate assets of the transacting spouse are insufficient to
secure reimbursement. 42
Thus far Texas is the only community property state to enact a joint
management system, but the legislature recognized and attempted to cure
its inherent defects by enacting the statutory presumption which allows sepa-
rate disposition of mixed community property. The enactment of this
presumption indicates the need in a joint management system to exempt
small commercial transactions involving joint community property. While
the Texas law is often labeled a joint management system, it is in reality a
38 TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.24(a) (Supp. 1973).3 9 Id. § 5.24(b).
4 0 Id. § 5.24(a).
4
1 Id. § 5.24(b).
42 See Hudspeth, supra note 8, at 560. Mr. Hudspeth also envisions problems which
create a need for legislative clarification or judicial interpretation of the words
"possession" and "notice" as used in the Family Code. Many situations can be imagined
where the concept of possession would be very difficult to apply. Does a farmer who
wishes to convey good title to the corn in his field "possess" this in a manner which
brings presumption of § 5.24 into play? Does his wife "possess" the corn which she
drives to market sufficiently to pass good title to an innocent purchaser? The Code
also does not explicitly define what is meant by "without notice to the contrary."
Clarification in this area is necessary before a vendee with some notice of the non-
participating spouse's contribution to the goods can be legally secure in taking title
without the joinder of both spouses. For a discussion of the history and transition
of the law of notice and the importance of recitals in the area of purchases of com-
munity property, see Fritz, Marital Property-Effect of Recitals and Credit Purchases,
41 TEXAs L. REV. 1 (1962).
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joint and several management system in that it contains provisions requir-
ing joinder of both spouses to dispose of mixed community property, while
allowing one spouse to dispose of mixed community property if it is in
his possession and not subject to indicia of title.43  It is this feature of joint
and several management which allows many pre-1967 concealment, diminish-
ment, and entanglement cases to remain applicable to the current provi-
sions of the Family Code. Thus, under the Family Code the problems of
abuse of control and management of marital assets by the managing spouse
remain. These abuses are discussed in the next section in an attempt to out-
line procedural and substantive remedies which are available to combat
them.
It. DEVICES AND TECHNIQUES FOR CONCEALING MARITAL ASSETS
Section 3.63 of the Family Code empowers the court, in its equitable
jurisdiction, to divide the marital estate upon a decree of divorce or
annulment in such manner as it deems just and right.44 The spouse who
controls the majority of the community assets under the provisions of section
5.2241 has the opportunity to frustrate this goal in various ways. He or
she may deliberately conceal or diminish the value of the community es-
tate or enhance his or her separate estate at the expense of the community.
Income may be deferred until after the divorce decree has become final
while the expenses to be reimbursed by the community are overstated.
Still another method is to entangle community assets to make a "just
and right" division more difficult, if not impossible. It is the purpose of
this section to discuss some of the more common techniques used by the
spouse who has control of the community assets to conceal or diminish
these assets, and thereby outline the procedural and substantive remedies
available to thwart the attempts to misuse the management powers pro-
vided by the Family Code.
A. Transfers of Marital Assets Without Consideration or for
Inadequate Consideration
Each spouse in Texas has a vested interest in his or her separate prop-
erty, a vested right of enjoyment in the entire community estate, 46 and a
power of testamentary disposition over a one-half interest in the commu-
nity.47 Traditionally, the husband or wife does not have a testamentary
power of disposition over the other spouse's one-half interest in com-
43 TEX. FAM CODE ANN. §§ 5.22(b)-.24(a) (Supp. 1973).
44 Id. § 3.63.
45 Id. § 5.22.
46 Id. § 5.01 defines the spouses' separate property as that which is owned or
claimed by the spouse before marriage or is acquired by the spouse during marriage
by devise, descent, or gift. It includes money recovered for personal injury of each
spouse except for loss of earning capacity during marriage. This section also provides
that all but these enumerated items of separate property are community property,
and thus subject to the control characterizations found in § 5.22. See note 43 supra,
and accompanying text.
47 TEx. PoB. CoDE ANN. § 45 (1956).
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munity property, 48 and the surviving spouse retains the power of election
to take the property devised to him or her by the deceased spouse or to
invalidate the attempted testamentary disposition. 49 In spite of these strin-
gent restrictions on a spouse's testamentary power of disposition, it is rela-
tively easy for one spouse to make inter vivos gifts of community prop-
erty under his or her separate control to third persons.50 Thus, what a
spouse cannot accomplish by testamentary disposition, he or she may ac-
complish by inter vivos transfer, subject to the somewhat ambiguous con-
cept of fraud. 51
Inter Vivos Transfers. Throughout the development of the law of gifts,
judicial tendency has been to uphold inter vivos transfers despite the fact
that few, if any, incidents of ownership were conferred upon the donee
prior to the death of the donor.52 Whether this judicial tendency has
validity in the area of gifts ,of community property by either spouse is, how-
ever, open to question. It may be argued that, on the grounds of public
policy, courts should nullify rather than validate such transfers as inter
vivos gifts. 55 Nevertheless, Texas courts have often upheld such transfers,
and in doing so have utilized the legal principles developed in the more
sympathetic area of inter vivos versus testamentary dispositions, where
the intent of the donor usually prevails. 54
48 Rompel v. United States, 59 F. Supp. 483 (W.D. Tex.), rev'd on other grounds,
326 U.S. 367 (1945); Carroll v. Carroll, 20 Tex. 732 (1858); Campbell v. Campbell,
215 S.W. 134 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1919), error ref.
49 Wright v. Wright, 154 Tex. 138, 274 S.W.2d 670 (1955); Colden v. Alexander,
141 Tex. 134, 171 S.W.2d 328 (1943); Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 83 S.W.2d
620 (1935). See also Comment, The Widow's Election-A Study in Three Parts, 15
Sw. L.J. 85 (1961).
50 See Hartman v. Crain, 398 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1966) (at-
tempted gift of wife's separate funds); Collier v. Rives, 103 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1937) (loan of car); Shaw v. Shaw, 28 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1930), error dismissed (gift of savings certificates and bonds).
51 The court, under the theory of actual or constructive fraud, will invalidate ex-
cessive or capricious gifts which are detrimental to the nonconsenting spouse's rights
in the marital estate. See notes 95-116 infra, and accompanying text.
52 Quilliam, supra note 21, at 30.
53 Although it is undoubtedly clear that under § 5.22(a) of the Family Code, the
wife as well as the husband has the requisite power of management and control over
her separate community property, it is not clear just what the requirement of joint
management means in terms of alienation. Various types of ownership suggest some
possible solutions: (a) the law of joint tenancy would allow the joint manager to
alienate a fractional part of the mixed property; (b) the law of partnerships would
allow each spouse as agent of the other to alienate any or all property as long as it
was in pursuit of partnership business; or (c) the pure theory of joint management
would indicate that once a spouse has permitted his or her community property to
become mixed or mingled with the other mixed community property, the participation
of both spouses is required before a conveyance would be effective. If the in-
terpretation of (c) is accepted, then no gift of mixed community property would be
effective as to any part thereof unless both spouses participated, thus restricting the
statutory presumption of § 5.24 and hindering commercial transactions. But if the
interpretation of (a) or (b) is accepted, the pre-1967 problem of ownership versus
management and its problems of inequality and fraud which the Family Code was
written to alleviate is again present. These are problems that the courts will be faced
with and which must be answered clearly before the total impact of the Family Code
may be fairly determined.
54 Wohlenburg v. Wohlenburg, 485 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1972);
Shroff v. Deaton, 220 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1949); Ellsworth v.
Ellsworth, 151 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1941), error ref.
19731
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Texas courts have recognized that some type of present interest must
pass to the donee before the gift may be upheld, but have often avoided
the law of gifts, with its technical requirement of delivery, to find that such
an interest has passed.5 5 The courts have often applied the contract prin-
ciples of the law of third party beneficiary and the inherent power of
the managing spouse to make inter vivos dispositions to find the requisite
interest in the donee.
Recent Texas cases 6 have employed the concept that a person having
the rights of the intended beneficiary to a contract has received a sufficient
interest to characterize the transfer as a valid inter vivos gift. Krueger v.
Williams 57 involved the question of the validity of the survivorship right
of a third party in bonds and certificates purchased with community funds.
Five years before his death, Mr. Williams purchased an investment share
account in his name and the name of his daughter by a previous marriage.
After his death the daughter attempted to secture the proceeds under her
right of survivorship. The court held that no evidence of actual or con-
structive fraud on the rights of the donor's surviving wife was presented.5 8
In so doing the court stated: "'There was here . . . a contract . . . by
the terms of which the defendant, as registered beneficiary, acquired a
present vested though defeasible interest contemporaneous with the su-
perior rights of the decedent, and his death terminated his rights and
left the defendant with an indefeasible ownership entitling her to demand
payment of the proceeds.' "59 The court thus made it clear that the
third party beneficiary theory would be applicable to accord inter vivos treat-
ment to dispositions of community property made by the managing spouse.6 0
In other decisions the courts have sustained gifts on the theory of the in-
herent power of the managing spouse to make non-fraudulent gifts of the
community to third parties. 61 In the leading case of Shaw v. Shaw62 a
court of appeals upheld gifts of savings and Liberty Bonds which the de-
ceased had delivered to his son approximately twenty days before his
death. The donor, as the managing spouse of the particular community
55 Krueger v. Williams, 163 Tex. 545, 359 S.W.2d 48 (1962); Fleck v. Baldwin,
141 Tex. 340, 172 S.W.2d 975 (1943).
56 Quilter v. Wendland, 403 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. 1966); Wohlenburg v. Wohlenburg,
485 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1972); Estate of Reynolds v. Reynolds,
443 S.W.2d 601 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969), error ref. n.r.e.
57 163 Tex. 545, 359 S.W.2d 48 (1962).
58 Id. at 549, 359 S.W.2d at 50.
59 Id. at 550, 359 S.W.2d at 51, quoting Reynolds v. Danco, 134 N.J. Eq. 560,
36 A.2d 420, 421 (Ch. 1944).
60 In Edds v. Mitchell, 143 Tex. 307, 184 S.W.2d 823 (1945), the court held valid
a survivorship clause in a U.S. Savings Bond, thereby defeating the claim of the
husband's heirs to one-half of the proceeds. Although the federal interest in uniform
treatment of these bonds throughout the United States was an overriding consideration,
the court relied on the third-party beneficiary concept to find a vesting of an owner-
ship interest in the donee. But see Hartman v. Crain, 398 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Houston 1966), which held that a husband's creation of a joint bank account with
his sister was presumptively fraudulent as to the surviving wife.
61 See Salvato v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., 424 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston 1968); Alexander v. Alexander, 410 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1966); Shaw v. Shaw, 28 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1930), error dismissed.
62 28 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1930), error dismissed.
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property, was held to have had the sole right to dispose of the property
and "[b]arring any disposition made with intent to defraud [the surviving
widow], he may sell, barter, or give it away."'63
Coupled with these two rationales, the control provisions of section 5.22
may enable the spouse to diminish substantially the worth of the community
estate. It is possible for the spouse who contributes more personal earn-
ings and revenue from separate property to the marital estate to make a
valid inter vivos gift of a major portion of community property without
the joinder of the other spouse. The only control over such a disposition is
the concept of fraud which is often a vague and unworkable standard.64
Life Insurance Policies. Although the third party beneficiary concept has
been applied in the area of life insurance policies,65 the granting of the pro-
ceeds to the named beneficiary instead of the surviving spouse has been sus-
tained in most recent decisions through the court's reliance on the power of
the managing spouse to make inter vivos gifts. 66 In Jones v. Jones67 the
husband reserved the power to change the beneficiary of his life insurance
policy. Shortly before his death he changed the named beneficiary from
his wife to his father, and although the premiums had been paid with com-
munity funds, the court denied the surviving wife an interest in the pro-
ceeds. The court stated that the managing spouse had the right to dispose
of the community assets within his control unless fraud could be proved.
While the marriage continues, "he may expend their joint estate ever so un-
wisely, may squander it in 'riotous living' or may give it away . . . yet [,the
surviving wife] cannot be heard to complain. 6 8  Under the provisions of
the Family Code69 this power of disposition now rests in each spouse when
the property conveyed is under his or her sole management. 70
The remedies available to the non-consenting spouse when he or she
shows an abuse of control by the managing spouse over a life insurance
policy vary with the circumstances of the case. It has been suggested in
63 Id. at 176, quoting Moody v. Smoot, 78 Tex. 119, 123, 14 S.W. 285, 286
(1890). See also Teas v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 460 S.W.2d 233 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1970), error ref. n.r.e.; Bohn v. Bohn, 455 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [lst Dist.] 1970), error dismissed. But see Roberson v. Roberson, 420
S.W.2d 495 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1967), error ref. n.r.e., where a
gratuitous transfer of various community assets by a husband to his putative wife was
held invalid as in fraud of his lawful wife.
64 The courts will set aside a spouse's conveyances of community property upon
a proper showing of an actual intent to defraud the other spouse or circumstances
from which fraud is presumed. See notes 95-116 infra, and accompanying text.
65 In Edds v. Mitchell, 143 Tex. 307, 320, 184 S.W.2d 823, 830 (1945), the
supreme court, in dictum, stated that "[w]hen the insurance is effected in favor of
a third person, his rights under the policy vest immediately. . . . [T]he right of the
beneficiary named in the policy is not indefeasible but it is nevertheless a vested right."
66 Salvato v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., 424 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston 1968); Alexander v. Alexander, 410 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1966); McCurdy v. McCurdy, 372 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1963), error
re/. 67 46 S.W. 265 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1912).
68 Id. at 268.
69 TEx. Fm. CODE ANN. § 5.22(a) (Supp. 1973).
70 Wohlenburg v. Wohlenburg, 485 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1972);




some cases that whether or not there is an intent to defraud, the surviving
spouse may be entitled to reimbursement from the remainder of the com-
munity estate for the share given away. 71 In some cases the surviving spouse
has recovered only one-half of the proceeds, 72 while in others the spouse
was allowed to recover the entire amount. 73 The problem in this area is
that neither the legislature nor the courts have clearly indicated what cir-
cumstances are adequate to give the non-joining spouse a right to attach
the proceeds or to seek reimbursement from the community. One point
does seem clear: If there is evidence that the gift is made solely for
the private purposes of the managing spouse, the non-consenting spouse is
normally entitled to a remedy.74  However, a subjective intent to defraud is
often difficult to prove, and the presumption of a valid gift may leave the
non-joining spouse without an adequate remedy.75
The leading case of Davis v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America7 6
indicated standards used by many courts in determining the existence and
extent of the non-consenting spouse's remedy. 77 Mr. Davis purchased an
$11,000 life insurance policy and designated his wife as beneficiary. Three
weeks after his wife filed for divorce, he changed the beneficiary of the
policy to his mother. Before the divorce became final the insured died, and
Prudential paid the proceeds to his mother. In an action brought by the wife,
the district court found that the change of beneficiary did not constitute ac-
tual fraud on the rights of the wife, and, thus, the proceeds had been
properly payable to the husband's mother. 78  On appeal the Fifth Circuit
reversed. By examining the facts at the time of the donor's death-a
gift of over ninety-eight percent of the total worth of the community es-
tate and no apparent need to make the mother beneficiary of the pol-
icy-the court stated that ".the gift of the entire proceeds to [the mother]
constituted a capricious and excessive gift of community property which
was in constructive fraud of his wife's rights. '79 The court granted the
wife only one-half of the proceeds because her husband could legally dispose
71 McCurdy v. McCurdy, 372 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1963), error
ref.; Krueger v. Krueger, 62 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1933), error dis-
missed.
72 Davis v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 331 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1964); Murphy
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 498 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1973); Aaron v. Aaron, 173 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1943), error
ref. w.o.m.
73 Moore v. California-Western States Life Ins. Co., 67 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Amarillo 1934), error dismissed.
74 See, e.g., Kemp v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. of America, 205 F.2d 857 (5th
Cir. 1953); Givens v. Girard Life Ins. Co., 480 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1972), error ref. n.p.e.
75 For an excellent discussion of the early development in this area of the law,
see Huie, Community Property Law as Applied to Life Insurance, 18 TExAs L. REv.
121 (1940).
76 331 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1964).
77 Although this case was decided before the Family Code became effective, its
rationale has been followed by several post-Family Code cases. See Givens v. Girard
Life Ins. Co. of America, 480 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972), error ref.
n.r.e.; National Maritime Union v. Augustine, 458 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1970).
78 Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Davis, 213 F. Supp. 235 (E.D. Tex. 1963).
79 331 F.2d 346, 352 (5th Cir. 1964).
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of his one-half interest.
It now appears that the non-consenting spouse will be entitled to at least
one-half of the proceeds if he or she shows that under the circumstances of
the particular case the gift was excessive or depleted the community to a
major extent, and thus was in constructive fraud of his or her rights. The
non-consenting spouse does not have the burden of proving the donating
spouse's subjective intent to defraud.8 0
Community Property Trusts. The creation of a trust with community prop-
erty may be upheld as an inter vivos gift, even though the interest passing
to the beneficiary is defeasible by virtue of the settlor's retained power of
revocation or alteration."' As in the area of insurance policies, a showing
that the managing spouse actually intended to defeat the non-participating
spouse's right or that the circumstances at the time of creation of the trust
or its effective date were constructive fraud on such rights will enable the
non-consenting spouse to challenge and set aside the trust.8 2  The broad
control and management provisions of section 5.2283 may enable a spouse
by the use of the revocable trust to unjustly enrich his or her separate es-
tate. For example, a spouse may use community assets under his separate
control in establishing a revocable trust. Should the non-joining spouse pre-
decease the settling spouse, it is possible that the trust will escape division
as a part of the community estate. By subsequently exercising the power
of revocation the managing spouse could make a gift of the deceased
spouse's share of the corpus to his or her separate estate.8 4
In the landmark case of Land v. Marshall5 the husband had, without the
wife's knowledge or consent, transferred the majority of the community as-
sets in trust to his daughter, as trustee, for the benefit of himself, his wife,
and his daughter. This transfer left the wife only a life estate in the com-
munity property, and deprived her of a testamentary power of disposition
80 Archer v. Griffith, 390 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. 1964); Murphy v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 498 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973); Givens v.
Girard Life Ins. Co. of America, 480 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972),
error ref. n.r.e.
81 Westerfeld v. Huckaby, 474 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. 1971). Under the Texas Trust
Act, all trusts are revocable unless expressly made irrevocable, TEx. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 7425b-41 (1960), but the power to amend the trust must be specifically
reserved. Id. § 22.8 2 Johanson, Revocable Trusts and Community Property: The Substantive Prob-
lems, 47 TEXAS L. REv. 537 (1969). See In re Marriage of McCurdy, 489 S.W.2d
712 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973), error dismissed, where the court held invalid
a trust created for the benefit of the settlor's daughter out of community funds, because
by diminishing the total estate, it diminished the need for funds which the husband,
on divorce, would be required to provide out of his separate estate for the support,
education, and maintenance of his daughter in a manner in keeping with the family's
status.
83 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.22 (Supp. 1973).
84 In Salvato v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., 424 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston 1968), the husband attempted to enrich his separate estate by naming it
beneficiary of a life insurance policy, the premiums of which were paid out of
community funds. The wife was awarded a half interest in the proceeds as the court
recognized that a managing spouse can give his or her interest in the community to
a third person, but could not give the other spouse's interest in the community to his
separate estate. See also Martin v. Moran, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 509, 32 S.W. 904(1895).
85 426 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1968).
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over her one-half interest. In his capacity as community manager, Marshall
expressly reserved the income of the trust for life, the power to revoke or
modify the trust, and the power to direct the trustee in her transactions con-
cerning the trust. The Texas Supreme Court held the trust invalid based
on the doctrine of illusory trusts-"the husband has the power to create an
inter vivos trust . . . but when [the wife's] community share is involved,
the wife can require the trust to be real rather than illusory, genuine rather
than colorable."8 6 The court did not grant the remedy normally allowed in
the case of invalid inter vivos gifts-setting aside one-half of the gift- 7
but declared the entire trust invalid. In the court's opinion the entire
trust failed because the invalidity of the one-half interest disrupted the
entire scheme devised by the husband for the security of his family.
The question which still remains in Texas law is what factors make a
trust illusory, fraudulent, or colorable? Citing with approval the leading
illusory trust case of Newman v. Dore,88 the court stated that the illusory
trust doctrine "expressly avoids the formulation of a fixed test for defining
an illusory trust, but instead states a general and flexible test which is
more adaptable to varied situations."'8 9 The opinion thus fell short of a de-
finitive statement of the standard which must be applied to determine il-
lusoriness, and relied on a flexible standard designed to be clarified in sub-
sequent litigation.90 Until a more definitive statement is written it would
appear that Land v. Marshall offers little more protection to the non-joining
spouse than the fraud test applied by Texas courts.9 1 The most appealing
aspect of the decision is that it may signify the beginning of a trend toward
a sterner judicial view of gratuitous transfers of community property by a
managing spouse.92
86 Id. at 846.
87 See note 80 supra, and accompanying text.
88 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937).
89 426 S.W.2d at 848.
90 Subsequent decisions have not expounded or clarified the test of Land v.
Marshall, although there has been some limitation of the doctrine. See Westerfeld
v. Huckaby, 474 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. 1971) (holding that the illusory trust doctrine is
limited in Texas to situations dealing with marital property and limited to instances
in which a nonconsenting spouse's property is used to fund the trust), noted in
26 Sw. L.J. 786 (1972).91 Professor Macdonald in his study of illusory trusts in various common-law and
community property jurisdictions concluded that, as a protective device of the non-joining
spouse, the doctrine has three major defects. First, it is illogical to decide cases solely
on the degree of control retained by the settlor. Professor Macdonald argued that the
simple power to revoke the trust, as granted by Texas trust law, gives the greatest
amount of control, enabling the settlor to have decisive control over the trust assets
and the trustee. No court has yet held the retention of the power to revoke, standing
alone, renders the trust illusory, but such an approach has been suggested in Note,
Wife's Forced Share and an Inter Vivos Trust, 60 MICH. L. Rav. 1197, 1200 (1962).
Second, the doctrine has not been applied consistently. This is in a major part at-
tributable to the "flexible standard" adopted by many courts. Third, the test is too
narrow. To state that the retained quantum of control is the sole criterion for illusori-
ness may lead to inconsistent and conflicting decisions. W. MACDONALD, FRAUD ON THE
WIDow's SHA.m 74-97 (1960).
92 Cf. National Maritime Union v. Augustine, 458 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1970); Bohn v. Bohn, 420 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1967), error dismissed. For excellent discussions on the entire subject of community
property trusts, see Bell, Community Property Trusts-Challenges by the Non-Partici-
pating Spouse, 22 BAYLOR L. REv. 311 (1970); Johanson, Revocable Trusts and Com-
munity Property: The Substantive Problems, 47 TEXAs L. REv. 537 (1969).
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Under the provisions of section 5.22 of the Family Code, 93 unless the
trust corpus is clearly the sole management property of the settlor, a trustee
or beneficiary should require joinder of both spouses for the creation of any
trust. Although no cases have turned on this point, future attacks by the
non-consenting spouse may be invoked on the theory that the transfer was
made by one who did not have the legal power to deal with assets placed
in the trust. How the Texas courts will deal with this problem remains to
be seen, but the joinder of both spouses may eliminate a future challenge
by one of the spouses that the trust was fraudulent, illusory, or not within
the management powers of the settling spouse.9 4
Fraudulent Transactions. The principle limitation on the control and man-
agement powers of a spouse under section 5.22 is that a disposition must
not be in fraud of the other spouse's rights in the marital estate. The first
expression in Texas of this limitation was made in Stramler v. Coe95 where
the court said: "No consent of the wife is necessary to a valid alienation of
community property by the husband. But excessive or capricious dona-
tions and sales, made with the intent to defraud the wife would be void; and
she would be entitled to her action against the property of the husband and
against third possessors."96 The problem throughout the development of
Texas marital property law has been seeking an equitable and judicially
manageable standard for "excessive or capricious donations."
Prior to 1953 Texas cases allowed the husband, as manager of the com-
munity estate, to dispose of community assets freely on the presumption
that such disposition was not in fraud of the wife's rights.9 7  Because of
the public policy encouraging alienability of property and binding com-
mercial transactions, the burden was placed on the wife to prove by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence the husband's subjective intent to defraud.98
In 1953 the Fifth Circuit rendered its decision in Kemp v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co.,99 which introduced into Texas marital property law the
concept of constructive fraud.
In Kemp the husband had purchased an annuity and life insurance
policy reserving the power to change the beneficiary. Prior to his death the
husband changed the beneficiary from his wife to his sisters. The policy
constituted over half of the community estate, and the widow brought an ac-
tion to recover the proceeds on the theory that the naming of the sisters con-
stituted a fraud on her rights. The federal district court held there was no
93 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.22 (Supp. 1973).
94 United States v. Gordon, 406 F.2d 332 (5th Cir. 1969), held that a wife whojoined with her husband in the execution of an instrument creating an insurance trust
relinquished her rights to challenge the trust on the grounds that it was fraudulent or
illusory.
95 15 Tex. 211 (1855).
96 Id. at 215.
97 See, e.g., Martin v. McAllister, 94 Tex. 567, 63 S.W. 624 (1901); Coleman v.
Coleman, 293 S.W. 695 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1927), error ref.; Krenz v.
Strohmeir, 177 S.W. 178 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1915), error ref.
98 Moore v. Moore, 73 Tex. 382, 11 S.W. 396 (1889); Rowlett v. Mitchell, 52 Tex.
Civ. App. 589, 114 S.W. 845 (1908).
99 205 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1953). At the time of this decision, the Texas Supreme
Court had not delineated a test for constructive fraud.
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evidence of actual fraud and such an essential element of the widow's ac-
tion could not be presumed.100 The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded,
holding that the wife was protected by article 3996 of the Texas Civil Stat-
utes 01 from fraudulent transfers of her community interest and such a fraud
could be either constructive (presumed from the surrounding circum-
stances and acts of the spouse) or actual (proof of the spouse's subjective in-
tent). 10 2  Texas courts have followed suit and the concept of constructive
fraud has been applied frequently.10 3
Although the concept of constructive fraud has received wide acceptance,
it is far from clear what circumstances must be present before it will be
applied by the courts. The most frequently cited factor is the value of the
assets transferred in relation to the total community estate. 10 4  Some courts
have found fraud when the gifts were made for no apparent reason and
constituted over one-half of the community estate. 10 5 But if the value of
the transferred assets was small in comparison to the total value of the com-
munity estate the courts have been very reluctant to find fraud even when
the gifts were quite substantial if considered alone.10 6 There are some ma-
jor problems with this test as a limitation on the rights embodied in section
5.22 which may actually thwart the discovery and return of concealed as-
sets. The managing spouse could transfer a substantial amount of commu-
nity assets by simply making small gifts, each constituting a minimal per-
centage of the community estate. Also the courts have applied a "hind-
sight" approach in measuring the value of the community estate,10 7 in which
100 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Baker, 107 F. Supp. 1, 2 (N.D. Tex. 1952).
101 Act of Feb. 12, 1927, ch. 30, [1927] Tex. Laws 42 (repealed 1967), which pro-
vided for protection against gifts or conveyances transferred by a debtor with intent
to defraud "creditors, purchasers, or other persons" who are entitled to such assets has
been recodified in TEX, Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 24.02 (1968).
102 Such an analogy to the remedy of the defrauded creditor was originally suggested
by Professor Huie in his classic article on community property and life insurance. See
Huie, supra note 75, at 132. The same concept of the intent to defraud creditors al-
lowed the court in Kemp to state that under the circumstances, as a matter of law the
husband's gift constituted a legal fraud on the rights of the wife regardless of his sub-
jective intent or motive.103 See, e.g., Givens v. Girard Life Ins. Co. of America, 480 S.W.2d 421 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1972), error ref. n.r.e.; Hartman v. Crain, 398 S.W.2d 387 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston 1966).
104 Murphy v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 498 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. Civ. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1973); National Maritime Union v. Augustine, 458 S.W.2d 832 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Beaumont 1970); Hartman v. Crain, 398 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston 1966).
105 Davis v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 331 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1964) (husband
changed the beneficiary from his wife to his mother of a life insurance policy that
constituted 98% of the total community property); Hartman v. Crain, 398 S.W.2d 387(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1966) (husband's creation of a joint bank account with his
sister which constituted more than double the husband's share of the community prop-
erty).106 Krueger v. Williams, 163 Tex. 545, 359 S.W.2d 48 (1962) (no fraud when the
husband disposed of his wife's $10,000 interest by placing it in a joint survivorship ac-
count between himself and a daughter of a previous marriage; the husband had be-
queathed $5,000 to the wife); Brown v. Brown, 282 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1955), error ref. n.r.e. (no fraud where children of a previous marriage and grand-
children were named beneficiaries of community life insurance policies to the extent of$30,000 when the community estate at the time of the husband's death was valued at
approximately $250,000).
107 See Krueger v. Williams, 163 Tex. 545, 359 S.W.2d 48 (1962); National Mari-
time Union v. Augustine, 458 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1970).
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the fraudulent gift is measured against the value of the estate when the
fraud is discovered and not when it is perpetrated. Finally, the courts often
test for fraud by determining whether the non-consenting or surviving spouse
has been provided for adequately.' 08 Despite a gift of over one-half of the
community estate, if the surviving spouse has other adequate means of sup-
port the gift may be upheld. These tests used to determine the circum-
stances of constructive fraud may at times be employed to further the con-
cealment scheme of a spouse rather than place adequate limitations on his
or her management powers. 109
Another principle factor relied on by the courts to find constructive fraud
is the relationship of the donee to the donor spouse. The courts will gen-
erally approve of transfers made in discharge of a legal, moral, or civic ob-
ligation, if not excessive. 110 However, the courts will often invalidate gifts
to third parties who bear no relation to the donor or have been a disrup-
tive force in the marriage."' In Roberson v. Roberson 1 2 the court in-
validated gifts by the husband to his putative wife made out of the com-
munity property of the first marriage. The court cited language from Wat-
son v. Harris1 3 to summarize the attitude of the Texas judiciary to gifts
of this nature: "It is so repugnant to our sense of justice that this court will
never sanction the proposition that a husband may desert his lawful wife,
and while living in adultery with another woman, donate to the latter as a gift
his wife's interest in property owned by them in common, unless the
Legislature enacts a law which will admit of no other construction."' 14
While the legislature has never enacted such a law it is interesting to
note that one provision recommended by the drafting committee of the 1967
Texas Matrimonial Property Act would have legislatively limited the power of
control and management of a spouse under 5.22 to make fraudulent gifts. 115
108 See Davis v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of America, 331 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1964);
Murphy v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 498 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1973); Brown v. Brown, 282 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1955),
error ref. n.r.e.
109 Prof. Quilliam in his article on gratuitous transfers of community property indi-
cated how the tests for constructive fraud may be used to reach anomalous results. It
is possible that the gift by a husband of one-half of a one million dollar community
estate might be upheld if the other half were still on hand at his death and the life
expectancy of his widow were not too great. The remaining $500,000 would be more
than sufficient for her adequate support. On the other hand, a similar gift of one-half
of a $100,000 estate would probably be considered fraudulent where the widow had
a considerable life expectancy. See Quilliam, supra note 21, at 42.
110 On the second trial of Kemp v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 220 F.2d 952 (5th
Cir. 1955), the court sustained the gifts to the sisters as beneficiaries of the life in-
surance policy because evidence was presented to show a moral duty of the insured
to support his sisters who were in need at the time.
111 See, e.g., Roberson v. Roberson, 420 S.W.2d 495 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1967), error ref. n.r.e. (gratuitous transfer of community funds to putative
wife); Alexander v. Alexander, 410 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1966) (des-
ignation of the putative wife as beneficiary of the husband's life insurance policy pur-
chased with community funds); Roye v. Roye, 404 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1966) (release by the husband of a debt, payable to the community, of a woman he in-
tended to marry immediately after he procured a divorce).
112 420 S.W.2d 495 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1967), error ref. n.r.e.
113 61 Tex. Civ. App. 263, 130 S.W. 237 (1910).
114 420 S.W.2d at 502, quoting Watson v. Harris, 61 Tex. Civ. App. 263, 272, 130
S.W. 237, 241 (1910).
115 The recommended provision was to have become art. 4623 of the Revised Stat-
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By the rejection of this provision, the legislature has opted to allow the courts
to promulgate the test for fraudulent transfers and concealment, and un-
fortunately at times this test has been inconsistent and inadequate. 116
B. Deferral of the Maturity of Community Property
Contingent benefits capable of maturing after the termination of the mar-
riage present unique problems to courts attempting to partition the marital
estate equitably. These benefits of contractual arrangements do not fit neatly
into the traditional distinctions between community and separate property.
Courts have been reluctant to concede that the one spouse has an interest
in future benefits that will accrue to the other. An examination of recent
cases indicates that the determining factor is whether the deferred benefits
have become fully vested in the participating spouse.
Pension and Profit-sharing Plans. Pension and profit-sharing plans offer
great problems of valuation and equitable division to Texas courts. Unlike
life insurance, these plans often have no immediate cash surrender value
and vary in terms and features. The proceeds from pension and profit-
sharing plans are normally considered earned property rights if the plans are
fully vested at the time of the dissolution of the marriage. The portion of
these benefits earned during marriage often constitute a major portion of
the economic worth of the marital estate and should be subject to division
by the trial court as part of the community property."17 Because of the
uncertainty concerning the interest of a non-participating spouse in these
plans before they become fully vested, they offer an opportunity for the
managing spouse to conceal the real worth of the community by dissolving
the marriage before full vesting.118
In Herring v. Blakely'" the Texas Supreme Court was directly pre-
sented with the problem of the classification of deferred compensation
plans. Herring participated in a profit-sharing plan maintained entirely
from contributions of his employer, and an annuity plan maintained by
joint contributions by him and his employer. Although both plans con-
tained spendthrift provisions and thus had no present assignable value,
Herring had the right to name a beneficiary in each. The husband's rights
in the plans had fully vested, although he had not retired and was not re-
ceiving benefits. After the wife had filed for divorce, the husband changed
the beneficiary of both plans from his wife to the trustee of his residuary
estate. Ten months later he died and the trustee brought an action against
utes and read as follows: "The spouse shall join in, or the non-joining spouse shall
consent to, disposition of community property to a third person when the disposition is
without substantial consideration and is not in discharge of a legal, moral, or civic obli-
gation." See Quilliam, supra note 21, at 43.116 Id.
117 Dominey v. Dominey, 481 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1028 (1973); Angott v. Angott, 462 S.W.2d 73 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Waco 1970); Webster v. Webster, 442 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1969).
118 Davis v. Davis, 495 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973), error dismissed.
119 385 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. 1965).
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the wife and the community receiver, asserting that no part of the corpus of
the plans was community property. The court found that the vested
plans could be classified as property, and since the employer's contributions
were actually compensation earned during marriage, the plans were com-
munity property.120  Further, the court held that community rights may
exist and are capable of division although not capable of being reduced to
immediate possession. 121
The decision in Blakeley indicates that the mere addition of a spend-
thrift clause by either the employer or employee does not affect the char-
acterization of the plans as community if they are fully vested.122 Had the
court accepted such an argument, the participating spouse or his employer
could write an agreement changing community to separate property by the
mere addition of a spendthrift provision. The case also held that a vested
interest in an unmatured compensation plan has sufficient substance to be
subject to the jurisdiction of the divorce court. Since most pension and
profit-sharing plans have early vesting dates, this should enable the court to
respond with a more equitable division of all the community assets at the
termination of the marriage. 123
Although Blakeley was a major step in the attempt to thwart the con-
cealment of the value of the marital assets at divorce, there still remain sev-
eral problems with which Texas courts must deal in order to halt this con-
cealment or diminishment of the real worth of the community through these
plans. One problem was foreshadowed by the recent decision in William-
son v. Williamson.124 The court held that the questioned pension plans
had ripened when the husband reached the age of fifty-five, since this was
when benefits could commence. The husband reached fifty-five on May
15, 1969, and filed for divorce eleven days later. The court was thus cor-
rect in its statement that the husband's two retirement plans "matured"
during his marriage, and the wife was fully entitled to one-half of the bene-
fits when paid to the husband. 25 However, a major question remained un-
answered: What would have been the decision had the husband filed for
divorce before, instead of after, the maturity date of the policies? There are
three possible answers to this question: the court should (1) disregard the
value of the benefits completely when partitioning the marital estate; or (2)
be allowed to partition mathematically the future retirement benefits regard-
less of their maturity; or (3) be allowed to consider potential retirement
benefits in making an equitable division of the estate of the parties. The
second approach seems far preferrable to the others because many of these
plans increase in value as the participating spouse continues to be em-
120 Id. at 846.
121 Id. at 847.
122 This was the position asserted by Herring to the court of appeals. He claimed
that such a spendthrift provision prevented him from having a fully assignable present
interest and that, therefore, the wife could not claim a community share in such a plan.
Blakeley v. Herring, 374 S.W.2d 677, 680 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1964), rev'd, 385
S.W.2d 843 (Tex. 1965).
123 See Comment, Partitioning Community Property, 2 ST. MARY's L.J. 219 (1970).
124 457 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1970).
125 Id. at 315.
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ployed. Thus, valuation and division is an almost impossible task for a
divorce court to accomplish at a stage long before such benefits are to be
received. 126
There are four situations in which the divorce court is faced with the
problem of attempting an equitable division of a pension or profit-sharing
plan. The first involves a plan presently vested and matured, freely
alienable, and capable of exact valuation. 127  This situation should offer little
difficulty in the partition proceedings before the court. The second is where
the benefits are not payable at the time of the divorce but are fully vested. 128
The courts have had little difficulty in holding these to be divisible commu-
nity property, despite spendthrift provisions and the unavailability of the
proceeds at the time of the dissolution of the marriage. Third is a plan
where on the death of the employee spouse the proceeds are distributable
to a named beneficiary. Although this type of plan might clearly be com-
munity property, it could be subject to disposition by the managing spouse
and, therefore, capable of concealment or fraudulent transfer. 129 Last is a
plan which is not fully vested and is not capable of adequate valuation.
This situation presents the greatest number of problems for courts in effec-
tuating an equitable division, and should be the subject of immediate legis-
lative action in order to protect fully the rights of the non-participating
spouse. Although contingent, the interest of the participating spouse is cap-
able of division on a fractional basis (the number of years of marriage
during which the spouse participated in the plan over the total number of
years of participation), and the non-participating spouse should receive an
expectant interest despite the possibility that such an interest could be totally
defeated.
Federal and Military Retirement Benefits. In considering a federal retire-
ment plan, the court in Allen v. Allen 30 held that a contribution of com-
munity property to such a plan did not establish a community right in the
126 The Supreme Court of Texas has not yet affirmatively passed on this question,
but this rationale seems to have been accepted by several courts of civil appeals. In
In re Marriage of McCurdy, 489 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973), errordismissed, the court held that the benefits under a retirement program, although not
capable of present distribution, were capable of division upon divorce even though
under certain contingencies the wife might not be able to receive anything. The court
awarded the wife "one-half of all benefits under the retirement plan ... if, as and
when such benefits are paid or received by the appellant," id. at 716, noting that the
husband had completed all but a few months of employment necessary to qualify for
the benefits during the marriage. The court recognized that the accruals credited after
the divorce would not be properly acquired during this marriage, yet did not restrict
the division to community property alone, because separate property interests of the
husband may be awarded to the wife in order to effect an equitable property division.See also Webster v. Webster, 442 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969).
It should be noted that in these cases, the pension plans were written so that there waspartial vesting throughout the husband's employment but not full vesting until a set
number of years.127 Kirkham v. Kirkham, 335 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1960).
128Webster v. Webster, 442 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969);
Mora v. Mora, 429 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1968), error dismissed.129 See notes 95-116 supra, and accompanying text.
180 363 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1962).
[Vol. 27
COMMENTS
proceeds.'' The court ruled that because federal law controlled over state
law, it could not award the widow any interest in the retirement bene-
fits. 18 2  It thus seems that if a specific federal statute provides for a late
maturity date, the non-participating spouse's right in such a plan may be
completely defeated if the marriage is dissolved prior to that time.
In Kirkham v. Kirkham13 3 the husband had completed twenty-two years
of military service at the time of his divorce. Although he had not retired
and was receiving no benefits, his rights in the retirement plan had fully
vested, since he had served the required number of years. The wife was
awarded an interest in the future benefits computed by dividing the num-
ber of months of marriage while the husband was in the service by the
total number of months the husband was in the service, with half of the
resulting amount being the portion of each monthly benefit the husband
was to pay his wife.'3 4  The courts have viewed such benefits as earned
property rights accruing during marriage and subject to division upon di-
vorce.135
In the recent case of Busby v. Busby'3 0 the Texas Supreme Court held
that the wife had a cognizable interest in the military disability retirement
benefits of her husband. The husband had been ordered to retire, due
to a diabetic condition, on the same day the couple's divorce was granted,
but he was entitled to the benefits because the retirement plan was fully
vested. The court's reasoning again turned on the fact that the benefits were
earned property rights constituting community property, subject to equal di-
vision between the husband and wife. The dissenting opinion pointed to the
inequity of the majority's decision, in that the title to benefits payable in the
future vest only when one becomes eligible for them. 13 7 The dissent's con-
tention was that benefits payable in the future should not constitute prop-
erty, but the trial court could properly take such benefits into consideration
in the partition of the marital estate.' 38
Busby and Kirkham also point out the need for judicial or legislative
clarification in the area of federal as well as state deferred payment plans.
In both cases, since the husband had completed twenty years in the service,
the benefits were capable of immediate enjoyment and thus fully vested.
But the question lingers whether the same conclusion would have been
reached had the dissolution of the marriage occurred prior to vesting.
From these cases it may be surmised that prior to serving twenty years
there is not an interest the divorce court can consider property or that is
131 Mr. Allen was a participant in a federal retirement plan which contained a
spendthrift provision.
132 Alien was distinguished but not overruled in Herring v. Blakeley, 385 S.W.2d
843, 847 (Tex. 1965), because no federal legislation was involved.
133 335 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1960).
'34 See also Mora v. Mora, 429 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1968),
error dismissed.
135 Dominey v. Dominey, 481 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1028 (1973); Marks v. Marks, 470 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1971), error ref. n.r.e.
130 457 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. 1970).




capable of division between the spouses. 139  If this is the case, the non-
participating spouse is placed in the precarious position of having his or her
rights defeated despite the length of the marriage if the plan has not fully
vested. Solutions similar to those seen in the previous section are available
to her, but to achieve the most equitable results a mathematical partition
of the future retirement plan regardless of vesting seems preferrable. 140
C. Enhancement of the Separate Estate with Community Funds
The Family Code provides that "property possessed by either spouse dur-
ing or in dissolution of marriage is presumed to be community property."'141
But section 5.22 will allow one spouse to manage and control the com-
munity property he or she would have owned had there not been a mar-
riage.142  It is possible for a spouse to divert community assets to projects
outside the community's interest without the requirement of reimbursement
to the non-consenting spouse or to the community.
Improvement of the Separate Estate. Most Texas cases hold that separate
or community ownership of fixtures or improvements is presumed to be the
same as the status of the property on which they are found. 143  This avoids
the problems inherent in situations where land and improvements upon it
are owned by different people. The burden is often placed on the chal-
lenging spouse to affirmatively trace community funds to the improvements
of the separate property unaided by any presumption that such funds ac-
quired during marriage are community assets.144  In the leading case of
Younger v. Younger 45 the husband claimed one-half of the enhancement
in value of certain separate property of the wife by reason of the construc-
139 The terms and conditions of the military retirement program as set out in 5
U.S.C. §§ 8331-39 (1970). Although the normal maturity period for these plans is
20 years, the method of compilation of this period varies with the particular branch
of the armed services.
140 The recent case of Davis v. Davis, 495 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1973), error dismissed, seems to reject this solution. In this case the husband had been
a member of the armed services for eight years before the divorce was filed, and was
capable of receiving retirement benefits only after 20 years of service. The trial court
awarded the wife an interest in the monthly benefits to be received by the husband
computed in accordance with the method set out in the text accompanying note 134
supra. The court of civil appeals reversed, holding that the husband had not acquired
community property rights in the benefits which might become payable 11 years hence.
The controlling factor was that the benefits did not vest until the statutory period
transpired during the marriage relationship. The court, recognizing that at times such adecision could lead to inequitable results, stated that such inequity could be avoided by
the use of the broad powers of division of community property granted to the divorce
court under § 3.63 of the Family Code. Thus, consideration may be given to the
acquirement of a portion of military retirement benefits during marriage by the divorce
court. It is submitted that the problems of valuation and the contingent nature of the
benefits cast a doubt upon the decision in Davis as leading to a just and right division.
141 Tx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.02 (Supp. 1973).
142d. § 5.22.
143 See, e.g., Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 318, 83 S.W.2d 620, 627 (1935);
Howle v. Howle, 422 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1967); Edsall v. Edsall,
240 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1951).
144 See Burton v. Bell, 380 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. 1964); Bazile v. Bazile, 465 S.W.2d
181 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1971), error dismissed w.o.j.; Day v. Day, 421
S.W.2d 703 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1967).
145 315 S.W.2d 449 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1958).
[Vol. 27
COMMENTS
tion of a hotel which was allegedly built with community funds. The court
of civil appeals, reversing the trial court's decision that the husband was en-
titled to this one-half interest, held that he had not adequately discharged
his burden of proof to trace the community funds into the structure erected.
on the wife's property.146 The court found, in effect, that the challenging
spouse must not only show that community funds were used in the construc-
tion of the improvements, but also prove the amounts to be repaid., 47
Norris v. Vaughn148 presented to the Texas Supreme Court the prob-
lem of tracing both community funds and efforts into the separate estate
of one spouse. In this case the husband owned several gas wells before
his marriage, but during his marriage a certain amount of labor and main-
tenance was required to keep the wells producing. The wife's heirs sued
for one-half the proceeds of the gas production, claiming that the ex-
penditure of community labor, talent, and funds in its production and sale
had impressed upon it community character. The court concluded that the
heirs did not have any interest in the proceeds, because they had failed to
plead and prove such a large expenditure of community labor and talent as
to change the status of the property from separate to community. There-
fore, the gas produced and the proceeds therefrom remained the separate
property of the husband. 149
This stringent requirement of tracing is questionable in light of the revised
control provisions of the Texas Family Code. 150 With the husband or wife
both capable of dealing with separately controlled community assets freely,
it seems that either spouse is legally justified, under normal circumstances,
in using them to place improvements on his or her separate property. It
might be more justifiable to presume that the improvements were made with
community funds. Such a presumption would conform to the general propo-
sition in marital property law that all assets earned or acquired during mar-
riage are presumed community property.' 5 ' Further, the spouse claiming
separate assets would be required to trace and identify them.'5 2  Also,
the possibility of unjust enrichment to the separate estate of one spouse at
the expense of the community would be greatly curtailed.' 53
Payment of Prenuptial Debts. Another technique of diminishment of the
community estate is the use by one spouse of community funds under his or
146 Id. at 453.
147 See Burton v. Bell, 380 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. 1964); Lane v. Kittrel, 166 S.W.2d 763
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1942).
148 52 Tex. 491, 260 S.W.2d 676 (1953).
14) Id. at 499, 260 S.W.2d at 680. In Cone v. Cone, 266 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1953), error dismissed, the court stated that oil produced from a sepa-
rate lease was separate property regardless of the amount of community funds and
effort spent on its production.
150 TEx. Fm. CODE ANN. § 5.22 (Supp. 1973).
151 Id. § 5.02.
152 Tarver v. Tarver, 394 S.W.2d 780, 783 (Tex. 1965); Kirtley v. Kirtley, 417
S.W.2d 847, 853 (Tex. Civ, App.-Texarkana 1967), error dismissed.
153 Should the spouse be successful in tracing community funds into separate im-
provements, the measure of recovery is not the amount expended, but the amount that
such expenditures have enhanced the value of the separate property. In re Marriage
of Greer, 483 S.W.2d 490 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1972), error dismissed; Harris v.
Royal, 446 S.W.2d 351 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1969), error ref. n.r.e.
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her separate control to discharge, during marriage, antenuptial debts en-
cumbering separate property. In this area the party seeking reimbursement
for these expenditures must affirmatively trace community funds into the
discharge before reimbursement will be allowed.154
In Colden v. Alexander' 55 the husband purchased land before his mar-
riage, but used community funds to pay the purchase-money debt. The
wife claimed a one-half interest because of such community payments.
The Texas Supreme Court rejected the wife's contention, stating that the
character of the husband's title, whether separate or community, "depends
alone upon the existence, or non-existence, of the marriage of Mr. and Mrs.
Colden at the time of the incipiency of the right in virtue of which he ac-
quired title."' 56 Although the court noted that the payment out of the com-
munity of such items would normally require reimbursement, 157 this would
not be the case unless the expenditures were adequately traced, and it was
shown that they were greater than the benefits received by the community
from the land. The court's opinion was also based on the fact that the wife's
contention would lead to uncertainty regarding land titles purchased on
credit by either spouse before marriage, and thus would require litigation in
almost all instances to determine the real ownership thereof.
In Klein v. Klein'5 8 periodic payments had been made out of community
funds to discharge a purchase money lien on the wife's separate property.
The court of civil appeals reformed the trial court's decision that a lien in
favor of the husband was an equitable result since the wife was "generally"
indebted to the community because of the free spending of community funds.
The court held that since the right to reimbursement was equitable, and
the husband did not prove that the community income from the separate prop-
erty was less than the amount paid by the community, the lien against the
wife's separate property was not justifiable.'5 9
The holdings in Colden and Klein illustrate that a non-consenting spouse
may face a double burden of proof in this area before any remedy may be
afforded by the court. First, the spouse must trace community funds into
the property without the benefit of the presumption that funds acquired
during marriage are community property. 160 The argument may be made,
as in other areas,' 6' that the burden placed on the challenging spouse is
much too stringent and, therefore, may allow unjust enrichment to the sep-
arate estate of one spouse at the expense of the community. Secondly,
should the non-consenting spouse be successful in tracing the community
154 Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 350, 83 S.W.2d 620 (1935); see Padgett v. Padgett,
487 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1972), error ref. n.r.e.; Klein v. Klein, 370
S.W.2d 769 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1963).
155 141 Tex. 134, 171 S.W.2d 328 (1943).
156 Id. at 147, 171 S.W.2d at 334.
157 See MacRae v. MacRae, 144 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1940), error
ref.
158 370 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1963).
159 Id. at 774.
160 Edsall v. Edsall, 240 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1951); Rolater v.
Rolater, 198 S.W. 391 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1917).
161 See note 150 supra, and accompanying text.
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funds, unless that spouse can prove that the expenditures by the commu-
nity were greater than the benefits received, reimbursement will be denied. 162
Often because of inadequate bookkeeping and lack of information this proof
may be impractical or impossible for the non-managing spouse.
Recitals in the Conveyance of Property. The probative effects which
Texas courts have assigned to deed recitals which expressly declare land pur-
chased during marriage the separate property of the grantee-spouse, offer
an opportunity for the managing spouse to diminish the real worth of the
marital estate.
In Lindsay v. Clayman'6" the wife entered into a contract with a third
party for the sale of land which named her as grantee and recited that pay-
ment was to be made from her separate money. After the death of the
wife, the husband instituted suit for title and possession of the land on the
theory that community funds were actually used as payment on the con-
tract. The Texas Supreme Court held that as a matter of law, the land
was vested solely in the wife's separate estate.' 64  The court relied upon
the inception-of-title doctrine, holding that ownership of land is determined
by the circumstances existing at the time of purchase and subsequent cir-
cumstances have no bearing unless they create a recognizable property inter-
est.'65 Since the deed stated the nature of the estate conveyed to the wife, and
the husband had knowledge of the deed, extrinsic evidence was inadmissible -to
prove other ownership or payment from another source than that indicated
by the recital.' 66
In contrast to the inception-of-title rule is the decision in Hodge v. El-
lis. 167 The wife had acquired two parcels of land on credit. The deeds
recited her separate ownership, and she alone signed the purchase-money
notes. Unlike the situation in Clayman, there was no direct evidence that
the husband had any knowledge of the transactions. The Texas Su-
preme Court concluded that the land was community property because of
evidence that it was bought with community funds.168 The court plainly re-
jected, without explanation, the inception-of-title rule, stating that the owner-
ship was "to be determined according to what funds went into the pur-
chases."'1 69 Thus, the court was willing to allow the husband to trace com-
munity funds into the separate property and thereby establish its com-
munity character.
In the recent case of Messer v. Johnson170 the Texas Supreme Court again
faced the problem of contractual recitals and parol evidence. In Messer
the recital in the deed was that the property was the separate estate of the
162 Klein v. Klein, 370 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1963).
163 151 Tex. 593, 254 S.W.2d 777 (1952).
164 Id. at 596, 254 S.W.2d at 779.
165 Accord, Henry S. Miller Co. v. Evans, 452 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. 1970); Dorfman
v. Dorfman, 457 S.W.2d 91 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1970).
166 Accord, Grunwald v. Grunwald, 487 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[list Dist.] 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
167 154 Tex. 341, 277 S.W.2d 900 (1955).
168 Id. at 352-53, 277 S.W.2d at 907.
169 Id. at 351, 277 S.W.2d at 906.
170 422 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. 1968).
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wife, but the deed did not state that the consideration was to be paid by the
grantee out of her separate funds. According to the husband, all pay-
ments on the contract were made with community funds. Further, he
testified that he had deliberately placed title in his wife's name as a matter
of convenience and to diminish the inheritance of his son by another mar-
riage. The heirs of the wife objected to such evidence as a violation of
the parol evidence rule, but these objections were overruled and judgment
was rendered that the property was community. This judgment was af-
firmed by the court of civil appeals.' 7 ' The Texas Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that where there was evidence that the challenging spouse
participated in the transaction, extrinsic evidence was not admissible to vary
the recital of the deed.17 2 The court rejected an argument for the relaxa-
tion of the parol evidence rule in this situation, on the theory that there
might 'be situations in which the spouses find it desirable to create an ap-
pearance of separate ownership while intending the wife to hold the prop-
erty in trust for the community. The court adhered to the general rule of
the inadmissibility of such evidence in the absence of equitable grounds for
reformation or rescission.
The inception-of-title doctrine, coupled with the stringent requirements
of the parol evidence rule, may be used to defraud a spouse of a share of
property purchased with community funds. The implication of these cases
is that if a spouse can obtain a recital on the deed that the property is the
separate property of that spouse, and conveyance is in exchange for a sep-
arate obligation, the property will be part of his or her separate estate, des-:
pite the subsequent use of community funds in deferred payment.17 3  If
payment of the purchase price with community funds is proved, it merely
creates a right of reimbursement in behalf of the community.,7 4  The re-
cital, as prima facie proof of payment with separate funds, makes it possible
for a dishonest spouse to create proof in support of a false claim of separate
ownership, and after a lapse of time it may be difficult or impossible for
the challenging spouse to rebut this prima facie case established by the false
recital.175 The only effective remedy against this concealment technique
is close judicial scrutiny of all deed recitals and their surrounding facts to
determine whether the property was actually purchased with separate funds.
III. REMEDIES OF THE NON-CONSENTING SPOUSE
The remedies available to the non-consenting spouse, when successful in
uncovering a plan by the managing spouse to conceal assets or the con-
171 Messer v. Johnson, 415 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1967), rev'd, 422
S.W.2d 908 (Tex. 1968).
172 Messer v. Johnson, 422 S.W.2d 908, 912 (Tex. 1968).
173 See Harrington v. Harrington, 451 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1970).
174 Lindsay v. Clayman, 151 Tex. 593, 254 S.W.2d 777 (1952).
175 The spouse's claim of separate ownership is also aided by the general presump-
tion that a person's conduct on any particular occasion was lawful and not fraudulent.
C. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 342, at 806 (2d ed. 1972). For an excellent discussion of
the problems presented in this area, see Fritz, supra note 42.
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cealed assets themselves, are as varied as the devices used to conceal the
assets. The appropriate remedy will depend not only on the type of as-
sets traced, but also on the time the scheme is exposed.
Remedies During Marriage. It is well established in Texas law that the
spouse may sue for the protection of his or her property rights, both com-
munity and separate, without obtaining a divorce. 176 In Letcher v. Let-
cher'77 the court established that, despite the refusal of divorce, the trial
court may adjudicate the question of the status of property and thereby pro-
tect the wife's separate estate. In Teas v. Republic National Bank178 the
court held that if a wife can establish fraud, she may also sue for the pro-
tection of her interest in the community estate during coverture. Although
a spouse may sue in these situations, it is very hard to challenge transac-
tions of the managing spouse unless they constitute capricious gifts or trans-
fers for inadequate consideration. 179  There is almost a complete lack
of remedies to prevent a spouse's waste of community property under his or
her separate control through dissipation or mismanagement.
One remedy that may be afforded by the court when the managing
spouse has been guilty of an abuse of the control and management pro-
visions of section 5.22 is rescission or compensation for the loss of the prop-
erty. In Bettis v. Bettis'80 the husband conveyed the family homestead to
a third party after inducing his wife by fraudulent representations to exe-
cute the deed. The court of civil appeals affirmed the trial court's decision
to rescind the transaction and to pay the wife the fair rental value of the
property for the time she was dispossessed. A recent case also indicates that
the non-consenting spouse may be protected against fraudulent conveyances
under the provisions of section 24.02 of the Texas Business and Commerce
Code,181 which protects creditors and other interested persons from transfers
of real or personal property intended to defraud or hinder the rights of such
persons in the property. 182
In Borton v. Borton'183 the court declared that a wife, apart from an ac-
tion for divorce, may maintain a suit against her husband for the conversion
of her separate estate, and also have a resulting trust declared in her favor
in lands claimed as her separate property and which the husband had pos-
sessed as his own. Since under the provisions of section 5.22 of the Family
Code the husband, as a matter of law, is no longer in possession and
control of his wife's separate estate and thus can no longer hold it against
her will, the wife has the remedy of the resulting trust to regain possession of
176 See Trimble v. Farmer, 305 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. 1957); Bettis v. Bettis, 83 S.W.2d
1076 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 19,35).
177 421 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1967), error dismissed.
178 460 S.W.2d 233 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970), error ref. n.r.e.
179 Bohn v. Bobn, 455 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1970),
error dismissed.
180 83 S.W.2d 1076 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1935).
181 TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANNm. § 24.02 (1968).
182 See Teas v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 460 S.W.2d 233 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1970), error ref. n.r.e.
183 190 S.W. 192 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1916), error ref.
1973]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
her separate estate.' 8 4 As seen in Shaw v. Shaw,""5 the court is authorized
to appoint a receiver to establish a separate interest in property and to
prevent the disposition or conversion of that interest. Also, the court has
authority to impound community property pending final action in a divorce
case.'
88
Remedies in a Suit for Divorce or Annulment. The actual suit for divorce
or annulment offers the greatest opportunity for the marital assets to be
equitably divided. The trial court is empowered to divide the marital estate
in any manner that it "deems just and right, having due regard for the
rights of each party and any children of the marriage."'1 7 A trial court's
conclusion that the division was fair cannot be reversed unless an abuse of
discretion is clearly established.' 88 Since the Family Code requires that the
division be just and right, it may include separate as well as community
property and does not require mathematical certainty.' 89
As one of the many remedies available to the divorce court in its equitable
jurisdiction, it may appoint a trustee or receiver to take control and dispose
of both separate and community property for the benefit of all interested
parties.' 90 An equitable lien may be affixed to the separate property of one
spouse to secure payment of a money judgment to the other. 19' Where
the managing spouse has paid the purchase price of property from com-
munity property or the separate estate of the non-consenting spouse, a re-
sulting trust may arise in favor of the non-consenting spouse if he or she
can clearly show the amount of community funds used. 192  Where the
managing spouse perpetrates a fraud on the other spouse by making ex-
cessive gifts of community property to third persons, the non-consenting
spouse may be entitled to recover the property from the defrauding spouse
or a third possessor by means of a constructive trust. 193
The ultimate goal of the court in the partition proceedings is to make it
equitable under the circumstances existing at the time of the divorce. To
this end, all the circumstances, including nature of the property, rights
of the parties and children, the earning capacity of each spouse, and the
184 The leading case in this area is Miller v. Miller, 285 S.W. 837 (Tex. Civ. App.-
San Antonio 1926), error dismissed w.o.j.18550 Tex. Civ. App. 363, 111 S.W. 223 (1908).
186 Ex parte Preston, 347 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. 1961).
187 TEx, FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Supp. 1973).
188 Freeman v. Freeman, 497 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1973); Harrison v. Harrison, 495 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973).
189 Brunell v. Brunell, 494 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973); Dobbs v.
Dobbs, 449 S.W.2d 119 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1969).190 Elliott v. Elliott, 422 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1967), error
dismissed; Gunther v. Gunther, 367 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1963), error
dismissed.
191 Mea v. Mea, 464 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1971); Mozisek v. Mozi-
sek, 365 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1963), error dismissed; Smith v.
Smith, 187 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1945). But see Brunell v. Brunell,
494 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973) (impressing a lien upon husband's real
property for the payment of the wife's attorney fees held beyond trial court's authority).
19 2 Cohrs v. Scott, 161 Tex. 111,338 S.W.2d 127 (1960).
L93 Magnum v. Magnum, 184 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1944);
see Bridges v. Bridges, 404 S.W.2d 48 (Tex, Civ. App.-Beaumont 1966).
[Vol. 27
COMMENTS
benefits that each spouse would have derived had the marriage con-
tinued, will be taken into account.194  A major objective of the court and
each lawyer in a divorce action must be to make sure all property properly
within the jurisdiction of the court is presented for division and accurately
valuated. If this objective is not met, the goal of a "just and right" division
cannot be accomplished.
Post-Divorce Remedies. Neither spouse is precluded by the divorce decree
from claiming his or her rights to property not partitioned at divorce, but
the court's broad power of equitable division is limited to a suit for di-
vorce. 195 In a suit brought for the division of community property after
divorce, the parties are treated as joint owners and as if they had never
been married. 190 Thus, under certain circumstances, if a spouse is suc-
cessful in concealing community assets beyond the divorce decree, an in-
equitable division may be obtained.
A typical case in this area of post-divorce remedies is Dudley v. Lawler.197
The wife obtained a divorce and property division judgment pursuant to a
property settlement made in contemplation of the divorce. She did not em-
ploy counsel for the divorce on the insistence of her husband that the cost
would be exhorbitant and that his lawyer would handle all aspects of the
divorce. The wife subsequently determined that the community estate had
been much larger than represented to her and sued for reimbursement by
an equitable bill of review. The court of civil appeals held that the hus-
band's fraud prevented the wife from knowing and presenting her rights,
and, therefore, the judgment of the divorce court was set aside. Lawler
points out that representations of the managing spouse as to the nature and
extent of the community estate, if false, are treated as a species of extrinsic
fraud, justifying the modification of the property settlement and judgment on
the theory of an implied trust.' 98
After the divorce decree has become final, the defrauded spouse is often
precluded from modifying the partition of property at divorce because of the
inability to value adequately the community estate. The defrauded spouse
may institute a suit for an accounting to disclose both the status of the con-
cealed assets and their accurate valuation.' 99 In Miller v. Miller,200 a tres-
pass to try title action, the court held there would be a resulting trust for
the wife where the funds used to purchase land were community property and
the husband fraudulently took title in his name. In Tarver v. Tarver20° an
action was brought by the second wife against her husband for partition of
their community estate and for accounting. Two children and two grand-
194 In re Marriage of McCurdy, 489 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973),
error dismissed; Miller v. Miller, 463 S.W.2d 477 (Tex, Civ. App.-Tyler 1971), error
ref. n.r.e.
195 Wade v. Wade, 295 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1956).
196 Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. 1970); Henderson v. Henderson, 425
S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1968), error dismissed.
197 468 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971).
198Id. at 163.
199 Norris v. Vaughan, 152 Tex. 491, 260 S.W.2d 676 (1953).
200 285 S.W. 837 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1926), error dismissed.
201 394 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. 1965).
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children of the husband's previous marriage intervened, seeking to with-
hold one-half of the property in the possession of the husband and second
wife from the partition proceedings on the theory that the husband was a
constructive trustee for them. The Texas Supreme Court held that the
children and grandchildren had failed to meet the burden of tracing com-
munity assets of the first marriage into property on hand at the divorce of
the husband and his second wife. Thus, although equitable remedies are
available to the non-consenting spouse and his or her heirs when the marital
assets were concealed at the time of the dissolution of the marriage, such
claims may be difficult to prove and such assets hard to trace because of the
passage of time or the burdens of proof placed on the challenging spouse.
'IV. CONCLUSION
The devices and techniques of concealment of marital assets are varied
and often incapable of detection. Often the non-consenting spouse is left
with the problem of nonexistent or inadequate remedies. There are at
least two solutions to these lingering problems. First is development of a sat-
isfactory community property and control system designed to frustrate in-
tentional and negligent dissipations of the community by either spouse, and
to satisfy the interest of family harmony, while also satisfying the state's in-
terest in ease of commercial transactions. Present Texas law often does
not fully accomplish the curtailment of attempts to diminish the commu-
nity by the managing spouse. A system of modified joint management and
control could accomplish the curtailment of diminishment techniques while
also maintaining family harmony and ease in commercial transactions.
This system would require that both spouses consent to community prop-
erty transactions of any nature in excess of a predetermined statutory
limit, such as five hundred dollars. If a spouse entered into a transaction
involving more than this limit without joinder of the other spouse, the non-
consenting spouse would be entitled to reimbursement or rescission.
The second solution concerns the need for adequate remedies in the area
of diminishment and mismanagement. Restraining orders and injunctions
to prevent the abuse of the control and management provisions of section
5.22, which threaten to dissipate the community, should be statutorily and
judicially encouraged. Redirection of the tracing doctrine in the area of
enhancement of the separate estate at the 'expense of the community is
necessary to strengthen the non-consenting spouse's claim rather than thwart
its existence. Finally, a further extension of the equity powers of the court
to all situations, before and after the divorce proceedings, dealing with the
partition of community property could effectuate an equitable solution des-
pite the time the concealed assets are discovered. The legislature and courts
must provide for adequate remedies under the Family Code for the protec-
tion of the separate and community estates of the spouses. Without these
remedies, the equality between the spouses under any system of control
and management will be totally frustrated.
[Vol. 27
